importance of the Committee as a channel for influencing EU decision taking for the Union's legislative regions was discussed.
In order to fully grasp the wider context of this question it is helpful to realize that of all sub-national entities in the EU the 'legislative regions' dispose of the best alternative channels to influence the EU institutions. As such one can name the possibility of some of the legislative regions to delegate a regional minister to the Council, 10 transnational networks (such as CALRE and REGLEG, see infra) and through Members of the European Parliament that are elected in regional constituencies (and possibly with a stronger sensitivity to regional issues).
Interesting in this regard is the study of Hepburn into the Bavarian, Scottish and Sardinian interests in influencing EU policy shaping by bypassing the state. She 10 See for a critical appraisal of this 'mode of influence' C. Jeffery, 'Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration, does it make any Difference? 38 Journal of Common market Studies (2000) 1: 1-23, 5. For a more optimistic perception, see M. Tatham, 'Going Solo, Direct Regional Representation in the EU ', 18 Regional and Federal Studies (2008) 5: 493-515, 501. describes as one of the weakening factors as far as Sardinia is concerned the fact that Sardinia is not a constituency for the European Parliament elections. 11 Probably the most important reason for the legislative regions to possibly lose interest in the CoR is their ability to shift their attention towards the central institutions of their respective Member State. 12 In Germany this process can most clearly be discerned. On the political level, it is interesting to note there that the Bavarian Christian Democrats (CSU) were amongst the driving forces behind the establishment of the CoR in the early 1990's whereas in the late 1990's it became the official policy of that party to focus more on the German Federal Government as the possible vehicle to further the Bavarian interest in the EU. 13 To some extent the same development has been noted in relation to the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas.
Whereas in an earlier stage (again early 1990's) many Comunidades started to 'face outwards' by establishing direct contacts with the EU Institutions (information desks were set up to channel lobby activities from the private and public sector within the Comunidades etc) and by 'manning' the CoR. 14 Yet in more recent years the Comunidades too seem to choose increasingly the national route to EU policy making. 15 One of the effects of the so-called 'CARCE agreements' was to endow them with more influence on the leading Spanish negotiators in the EU (who are still members of, or answerable to, the central government). 16 11 See E. Hepburn, 'The Rise and Fall of a 'Europe of the Regions '', 18 Regional and Federal Studies (2008) 5: 537-555. 12 See for instance Jeffery: 'the alliance with the state will always be the most effective and safe strategy to promote sub-national interest in the EU ', Jeffery, 2000, 14. 13 Under the motto 'protection of German competences includes the protection of Bavarian competences', see for a further discussion Hepburn, 2008, 543. 14 Giving the Comunidades (and in particular the historic 'nationalities' such as Catalonia) a more prominent place in EU policy shaping was believed to secure the votes from those who favour a stronger position of the Comunidades both within Spain and in the EU context, see Ricard Ramon i Sumoy, Multilevel Governance in Spain, building new patterns of subnational participation in EU policy-making, Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y de la Administración: Democracia y Buen Gobierno, <http://www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/congresos/congreso_07/area05/GT20/RAMONiSU [113] [114] [115] [116] [117] [118] [119] [120] [121] [122] [123] [124] [125] [126] [127] 118. 15 See Börzel, 2002, 123 and 130. 16 In sum, there are a number of alternative channels available for the legislative regions and these are increasingly used. Yet such availability need not necessarily lead to their diminishing interest in the activities of the Committee. 17 After all, why would the availability of one channel exclude the other?
I.1 Research Design
The starting point for this contribution was a study of relevant legal and political science literature as well as legal documentation such as EU legislative-and non- In the course of these interviews old dilemma's surrounding the CoR were revisited.
Most notably, the dilemma of the Committee's heterogeneous composition as either a strengthening factor in terms of legitimacy or as a weakening factor in terms of efficacy came to the fore. These questions were put before members of the Committee representing 'legislative regions' (as defined in section II), more in particular representatives from the Belgian Gewesten/Régions and from the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas). These answers were then contrasted with those from representatives from Committee members that represent the lower authorities from a decentralised unitary state (The Netherlands). 20 The results of the (anonimised) 21 interviews form the basis of section VI ('The legislative regions in the Committee; current views'). 17 As was also stressed by Hepburn, 2008, 539. 18 For every full member of the CoR there is an alternate member that may replace her or him at commission meetings and at the plenary meeting. 19 The responses to these questions were used in an anonymous fashion. A draft text of this contributions has been sent for approval to the respondents prior to publication. 20 The questionnaire used to conduct these interviews is attached to this paper in Annex I . 21 As all interviewees hold political offices, anonimity was used as a tool to prevent possible political coloration of the repsoneses. It may also serve to prevent possible 'institutional bias' as the members of the Committee may wish to defend 'their' institution.
II.
What entities. The exclusivity of these two networks might be seen as a confirmation of their domestic power but it can also be regarded as a tool for the further enhancement of that power. The mere potential to pool resources could attribute the individual members of these entities a distinctive quality that sets them apart from other sub-national entities. Thus, to operationalize this study, the entities allowed by their 'peers' to join these two exclusive networks will be regarded as 'legislative regions'.
Self identification may also be a useful tool in other contexts of research. For one, the concept of 'national parliament' is also less straightforward as might be thought (considering the constitutional diversity in this respect 
III. A brief history of the Committee of the Regions
To appreciate the special relationship between the Committee and the EU's legislative regions it is important to unearth the Committee's institutional history. may be recalled that in its early days, the half-hearted start of the CoR was obvious from its limited funding. 42 That undoubtedly had an effect on the quality of its opinions and hence its reputation. 43 Overall the Committee had to await the Lisbon Treaty to really see an important difference regarding its position in the EU institutional complex.
IV. Institutional Position of the Committee of the Regions after Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon presents a reason in its own right for re-visiting the CoR. 44 Although it is safe to say that after 'Lisbon' the list of institutional desiderata of the CoR is all but fulfilled some significant changes were achieved. The major shortcoming is the failure to promote the CoR to a full-fledged EU institution with a more extensive role in the EU legislative process as well as a direct role in the early warning system on subsidiarity. Yet, the number of areas on which its consultation is mandatory has again increased after 'Lisbon'. 45 In fact, a recent study undertaken by Neshkova demonstrated that opinions of the CoR do often produce effects in particular vis-a-vis the European Commission. Especially in certain areas of policy, the Commission proves quite willing to take on board suggestions of the Committee.
As the Commission proposal is hard to change for the 'bicameral legislature' of the of EU law: respect for the 'constitutional identity' of the Member States (art 4(2) EU).
Having said that, the Committee has traditionally favored this wider notion of subsidiarity as its major concern (decision taking 'as closely to the citizen as possible'). 52
To ascertain whether the new formulation of the subsidiarity principle post Lisbon produces any legal effects in court, the final test would of course be to bring a case before the ECJ. At this juncture it is interesting to mention the second important The greatest variation in the general pattern is shown by the United Kingdom. This body has been sub-divided into two separate chambers, one for the regions (all levels above that of the cities or communes) 84 and one for the local authorities (cities and communes), yet, according to the interviewee in practice this resulted in 'different people ending up doing the same work'.
When asked if the networks of CALRE and REGLEG would lead to a lesser interest of the legislated regions (both their executives and their legislatures) in the CoR, the respondents of the legislative regions replied that an increase of activities of the legislative regions in the context of the REGLEG and CALRE networks could indeed be expected. Yet, they also stressed that this form of horizontal cooperation between the (self-proclaimed) legislative regions should not be regarded as the evidence that the CoR is becoming increasingly passé for them. These same respondents stressed the fact that the CoR has concluded strategic partnership agreements with both REGLEG and CALRE so as to maximise the complementarity between these two networks. The Committee was said to maintain its 'main hub' function for both these selective networks. In this regard attention was also drawn to the fact that both CALRE and REGLEG are networks that lack the resources such as those available to the CoR and that the yearly rotating presidency of these two networks sometimes hampers their effectiveness (depending on the presidency). The institutional embedding in the CoR of CALRE and REGLEG is thus welcomed by the legislative regions.
In this context, attention was also drawn to the fact that many key positions in the accessions were deemed to have a large impact although not, as was the hypothesis of this contribution, in relation to the local -regional divide. Rather, one might speak of the 'East -West' divide in this respect. This comes especially to the fore when the Committee is to advice on the issues of implementation/application of EU law. Since the vast majority of EU legislation is to be implemented on the regional and/or the local level, there is an interest in this issue across all levels of sub-national government. Yet, whereas the more highly developed entities (and these may range from federated states to municipalities) quite often prefer that the responsibility for implementation / application is diverted to them, the sub-national entities of the new 90 An interesting notion suggested by one interviewed member was that the Committee should try to bridge these different interests by focusing less on subsidiarity and proportionality in EU legislation but more for flexibility in EU legislative texts. EU measures should be phrased in such a way that they allow for flexible solutions on the local -regional or indeed even the national level.
that they would contemplate the second option (if that would prove possible on the national level) if the CoR would not undertake such legal action.
VIII. Conclusions
Based on the outcome of the interviews with the Belgian and Spanish members of the CoR representing legislative regions and with local authorities of the CoR (from The Netherlands), it would seem that some of the negative ideas that were brought in circulation in older literature about the Committee do not seem (anymore) to correspond to its present day reality. The local-regional divide, is described as a fact of life in the Committee's functioning with which a modus vivendi has been achieved.
In 
